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Abstract
Using loan-level data, we analyze the quality of subprime mortgage loans by adjusting their perfor-
mance for di®erences in borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, and house price appreciation
since origination. We ¯nd that the quality of loans deteriorated for six consecutive years before the
crisis and that securitizers were, to some extent, aware of it. We provide evidence that the rise and fall
of the subprime mortgage market follows a classic lending boom-bust scenario, in which unsustainable
growth leads to the collapse of the market. Problems could have been detected long before the crisis,
but they were masked by high house price appreciation between 2003 and 2005.
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re°ect the o±cial positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.1 Introduction
The subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 was characterized by an unusually large fraction of subprime mort-
gages originated in 2006 and 2007 being delinquent or in foreclosure only months later. The crisis spurred
massive media attention; many di®erent explanations of the crisis have been suggested. The goal of this
paper is to answer the question: \What do the data tell us about the possible causes of the crisis?" To
this end we use a loan-level database containing information on about half of all U.S. subprime mortgages
originated between 2001 and 2007.
The relatively poor performance of vintages 2006 and 2007 loans is illustrated in Figure 1 (left panel).
At every mortgage loan age, loans originated in 2006 and 2007 show a much higher delinquency rate than
loans originated in earlier years at the same ages.
Figure 1: Actual and Adjusted Delinquency Rate
The ¯gure shows the age pattern in the actual (left panel) and adjusted (right panel) delinquency rate for the di®erent vintage years.
Delinquency is de¯ned as being 60 or more days late with the monthly mortgage payment, in foreclosure, real-estate owned, or defaulted.
The adjusted delinquency rate is obtained by adjusting the actual rate for year-by-year variation in FICO scores, loan-to-value ratios,
debt-to-income ratios, missing debt-to-income ratio dummies, cash-out re¯nancing dummies, owner-occupation dummies, documentation
levels, percentage of loans with prepayment penalties, mortgage rates, margins, house price appreciation since origination, composition






































 Adjusted Delinquency Rate (%)
We document that the poor performance of the vintage 2006 and 2007 loans was not con¯ned to a
particular segment of the subprime mortgage market. For example, ¯xed-rate, hybrid, purchase-money,
cash-out re¯nancing, low-documentation, and full-documentation loans originated in 2006 and 2007 all
showed substantially higher delinquency rates than loans made the prior ¯ve years. This contradicts a
1widely-held belief that the subprime mortgage crisis was mostly con¯ned to hybrid or low-documentation
mortgages.
We explore to what extent the subprime mortgage crisis can be attributed to di®erent loan charac-
teristics, borrower characteristics, and subsequent house price appreciation. The subsequent house price
appreciation is measured as the MSA-level house price change between the moment of origination and
the moment of loan performance evaluation. For the empirical analysis, we run logit regressions with the
probability of delinquency being a function of these factors.
We ¯nd that loan and borrower characteristics are very important in terms of explaining the cross-
section of loan performance. However, because these characteristics were not su±ciently di®erent in 2006
and 2007 compared with the prior ¯ve years, they cannot explain the unusually weak performance of
vintage 2006 and 2007 loans. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in the debt-to-income ratio
raises the probability of delinquency 12 months after origination by as much as 1:1 percentage points.
However, because the average debt-to-income ratio was only 0:2 standard deviations higher in 2006 than
its level in previous years, it contributes very little to explain the inferior performance of vintage 2006
loans. The only variable in the considered logit regression model that contributed substantially to the
crisis is the low subsequent house price appreciation for vintage 2006 and 2007 loans, which can explain
about a 2 to 4 percentage points higher-than-average delinquency rate 12 months after origination.1 Due
to geographical heterogeneity in house price changes, some areas have experienced larger-than-average
house price declines and therefore have a larger explained increase in delinquency and foreclosure rates.2
We analyze the quality of loans based on their performance, adjusted for di®erences in observed loan
characteristics, borrower characteristics, and subsequent house price appreciation. For the analysis, we
compute the prediction error as the di®erence between the actual delinquency rate and the estimated
probability of delinquency based on the logit regression model. In Figure 1 (right panel) we plot the
adjusted delinquency rates, which are obtained by adding up the prediction errors and the weighted
average actual rates. This ensures having the same weighted average for the actual (Figure 1, left panel)
and adjusted (Figure 1, right panel) delinquency rates.
As shown in Figure 1 (right panel), the adjusted delinquency rates have been steadily rising for the
past seven years. In other words, loan quality|adjusted for observed characteristics and subsequent house
1Other papers that research the relationship between house prices and mortgage ¯nancing include Genesove and Mayer
(1997), Genesove and Mayer (2001), and Brunnermeier and Julliard (2007).
2Also, house price appreciation may di®er in cities versus rural areas. See for example Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) and
Gyourko and Sinai (2006).
2price appreciation|deteriorated monotonically between 2001 and 2007. Interestingly, 2001 was among
the worst vintage years in terms of actual delinquency and foreclosure rates, but is in fact the best vintage
year in terms of the adjusted rates. High interest rates, low average FICO credit scores, and low house
price appreciation created the \perfect storm" in 2001, resulting in a high actual delinquency rate; after
adjusting for these unfavorable circumstances, however, the adjusted delinquency rates are low.
In addition to the monotonic deterioration of loan quality, we show that over time the average combined
loan-to-value ratio increased, the fraction of low documentation loans increased, and the subprime-prime
rate spread decreased. The rapid rise and subsequent fall of the subprime mortgage market is therefore
reminiscent of a classic lending boom-bust scenario.3 The origin of the subprime lending boom has often
been attributed to the increased demand for so-called private-label mortgage-backed securities (MBSs)
by both domestic and foreign investors. Our database does not allow us to directly test this hypothesis,
but an increase in demand for subprime MBSs is consistent with our ¯nding of lower spreads and higher
volume. Mian and Su¯ (2008) ¯nd evidence consistent with this view that increased demand for MBSs
spurred the lending boom.
The logit regression speci¯cation used to compute the adjusted delinquency and foreclosure rates
assumes that the regression coe±cients on the di®erent explanatory variables remain constant over time.
We test the validity of this assumption for all variables and ¯nd that it is the most strongly rejected for
the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. High-LTV borrowers in 2006 and 2007 were riskier than those in 2001 in
terms of the probability of delinquency or foreclosure, for given values of the other explanatory variables.
Were securitizers aware of the increasing riskiness of high-LTV borrowers?4 To answer this question, we
analyze the relationship between the mortgage rate and LTV ratio (along with the other loan and borrower
characteristics). We perform a cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, with the mortgage
rate as the dependent variable, for each quarter from 2001Q1 to 2007Q2 for both ¯xed-rate mortgages
and 2/28 hybrid mortgages. Figure 2 shows that the coe±cient on the ¯rst-lien LTV variable, scaled by
the standard deviation of the ¯rst-lien LTV ratio, has been increasing over time. We thus ¯nd evidence
that securitizers were aware of the increasing riskiness of high-LTV borrowers, and adjusted mortgage
3Berger and Udell (2004) discuss the empirical stylized fact that during a monetary expansion lending volume typically
increases and underwriting standards loosen. Loan performance is the worst for those loans underwritten toward the end
of the cycle. DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) and Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerretche (2001) ¯nd that lending
booms raise the probability of a banking crisis. Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) show in a theoretical model that a change
in information asymmetry across banks might cause a lending boom that features lower standards and lower pro¯ts. Ruckes
(2004) shows that low screening activity may lead to intense price competition and lower standards.
4For loans that are securitized (as are all loans in our database), the securitizer e®ectively dictates the mortgage rate
charged by the originator.
3rates accordingly.
Figure 2: Sensitivity of Mortgage Rate to First-Lien Loan-to-Value Ratio
The ¯gure shows the e®ect of the ¯rst-lien loan-to-value ratio on the mortgage rate for ¯rst-lien ¯xed-rate and 2/28 hybrid mortgages.
The e®ect is measured as the regression coe±cient on the ¯rst-lien loan-to-value ratio (scaled by the standard deviation) in an ordinary
least squares regression with the mortgage rate as the dependent variable and the FICO score, ¯rst-lien loan-to-value ratio, second-lien
loan-to-value ratio, debt-to-income ratio, missing debt-to-income ratio dummy, cash-out re¯nancing dummy, owner-occupation dummy,
prepayment penalty dummy, origination amount, term of the mortgage, prepayment term, and margin (only applicable to 2/28 hybrid)












































We show that our main results are robust to analyzing mortgage contract types separately, focussing
on foreclosures rather than delinquencies, and numerous di®erent regression speci¯cations like allowing
for interaction e®ects between di®erent loan and borrower characteristics. The latter includes taking into
account risk-layering|the origination of loans that are risky in several dimensions, such as the combination
of a high LTV ratio and a low FICO score.
As an extension, we estimate our regression model using data just through year-end 2005 and again
obtain the continual deterioration of loan quality since 2001. This means that the seeds for the crisis were
sown long before 2007, but detecting them was complicated by high house price appreciation between
2003 and 2005|appreciation that masked the true riskiness of subprime mortgages.
There is a large literature on the determinants of mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures, dating
back to at least Von Furstenberg and Green (1974). Recent contributions include Cutts and Van Order
(2005) and Pennington-Cross and Chomsisengphet (2007).5 Other papers analyzing the subprime crisis
5Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) discuss the simultaneity of the mortgage prepayment and default option. Campbell
and Cocco (2003) and Van Hemert (2007) discuss mortgage choice over the life cycle.
4include Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2008), Mian and Su¯ (2008), DellAriccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008),
and Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2008). Our paper makes several novel contributions. First, we
quantify how much di®erent determinants have contributed to the observed high delinquency rates for
vintage 2006 and 2007 loans, which led up to the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis. Our data enables
us to show that the e®ect of di®erent loan-level characteristics as well as low house price appreciation
was quantitatively too small to explain the poor performance of 2006 and 2007 vintage loans. Second,
we uncover a downward trend in loan quality, determined as loan performance adjusted for di®erences
in loan and borrower characteristics as well as subsequent house price appreciation. We further show
that there was a deterioration of lending standards and a decrease in the subprime-prime mortgage rate
spread during the 2001{2007 period. Together these results provide evidence that the rise and fall of the
subprime mortgage market follows a classic lending boom-bust scenario, in which unsustainable growth
leads to the collapse of the market. Third, we show that continual deterioration of loan quality could have
been detected long before the crisis by means of a simple statistical exercise. Fourth, securitizers were,
to some extent, aware of this deterioration over time, as evidenced by changing determinants of mortgage
rates.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we show the descriptive statistics for the subprime
mortgages in our database. In Section 3 we present the econometric results and discuss explanatory factors
for delinquency. In Section 4 we discuss the increasing riskiness of high-LTV borrowers, and the extent
to which securitizers were aware of this risk. In Section 5 we analyze the subprime-prime rate spread and
in Section 6 we conclude. We provide several additional robustness checks in the appendices.
2 Descriptive Analysis
In this paper we use the First American CoreLogic LoanPerformance (henceforth: LoanPerformance)
database, which covers loan-level data on about 85 percent of all securitized subprime mortgages; more
than half of the U.S. subprime mortgage market.6 Since the ¯rst version of this paper in October 2007,
LoanPerformance has responded to the request by trustees' clients to reclassify some of its subprime
loans to Alt-A status. While it is not clear to us whether the pre- or post-classi¯cation subprime data
is the most appropriate for research purposes, it is reassuring that our results proved to be robust to
6Mortgage Market Statistical Annual (2007) reports securitization shares of subprime mortgages each year from 2001 to
2006 equal to 54, 63, 61, 76, 76, and 75 percent respectively.
5the reclassi¯cation. In this version we focus on the post-classi¯cation data. In Appendix A we provide
more details on the reclassi¯cation of the LoanPerformance database and show the robustness of our main
results to using pre-reclassi¯cation data.
There is no consensus on the exact de¯nition of a subprime mortgage loan. The term subprime can be
used to describe certain characteristics of the borrower (e.g., a FICO credit score less than 620),7 lender
(e.g., specialization in high-cost loans),8 security of which the loan can become a part (e.g., high projected
default rate for the pool of underlying loans), or mortgage contract type (e.g., no money down and no
documentation provided, or 2/28 hybrid). The common element across de¯nitions of a subprime loan is
a high default risk. In this paper, subprime loans are those underlying subprime securities. We do not
include less-risky Alt-A mortgage loans in our analysis. We focus on ¯rst-lien loans and consider the 2001
through 2008 sample period.
We ¯rst discuss the main characteristics of the loans in our database at origination. Second, we discuss
the delinquency rates of these loans for various segments of the subprime mortgage market.
2.1 Loan Characteristics at Origination
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the subprime mortgage loans in our database that were
originated between 2001 and 2007. In the ¯rst block of Table 1 we see that the annual number of
originated loans increased by a factor four between 2001 and 2006. The average loan size almost doubled
over those ¯ve years. The total dollar amount originated in 2001 was $57 billion, while in 2006 it was $375
billion. In 2007, in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis, the dollar amount originated fell sharply to
$69 billion, primarily originated in the ¯rst half of 2007.
In the second block of Table 1, we split the pool of mortgages into four main mortgage contract types.
Most numerous are the hybrid mortgages, accounting for more than half of all our subprime loans. A
hybrid mortgage carries a ¯xed rate for an initial period (typically 2 or 3 years) and then the rate resets to
a reference rate (often the 6-month LIBOR) plus a margin. The ¯xed-rate mortgage contract has become
less popular in the subprime market over time and accounted for just 20 percent of the total number of
7The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The O±ce of the Controller of the Currency,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the O±ce of Thrift Supervision use this de¯nition. See e.g.
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2001/pr0901a.html
8The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development uses HMDA data and interviews lenders to identify subprime
lenders among them. There are, however, some subprime lenders making prime loans and some prime lenders originating
subprime loans.
6Table 1: Loan Characteristics at Origination for Di®erent Vintages
Descriptive statistics for the ¯rst-lien subprime loans in the LoanPerformance database.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Size
Number of Loans (*1000) 452 737 1;258 1;911 2;274 1;772 316
Average Loan Size (*$1000) 126 145 164 180 200 212 220
Mortgage Type
FRM (%) 33:2 29:0 33:6 23:8 18:6 19:9 27:5
ARM (%) 0:4 0:4 0:3 0:3 0:4 0:4 0:2
Hybrid (%) 59:9 68:2 65:3 75:8 76:8 54:5 43:8
Balloon (%) 6:5 2:5 0:8 0:2 4:2 25:2 28:5
Loan Purpose
Purchase (%) 29:7 29:3 30:1 35:8 41:3 42:4 29:6
Re¯nancing (cash out) (%) 58:4 57:4 57:7 56:5 52:4 51:4 59:0
Re¯nancing (no cash out) (%) 11:2 12:9 11:8 7:7 6:3 6:2 11:4
Variable Means
FICO Score 601:2 608:9 618:1 618:3 620:9 618:1 613:2
Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio (%) 79:4 80:1 82:0 83:6 84:9 85:9 82:8
Debt-to-Income Ratio (%) 38:0 38:5 38:9 39:4 40:2 41:1 41:4
Missing Debt-to-Income Ratio Dummy (%) 34:7 37:5 29:3 26:5 31:2 19:7 30:9
Investor Dummy (%) 8:2 8:1 8:1 8:3 8:3 8:2 8:2
Documentation Dummy (%) 76:5 70:4 67:8 66:4 63:4 62:3 66:7
Prepayment Penalty Dummy (%) 75:9 75:3 74:0 73:1 72:5 71:0 70:2
Mortgage Rate (%) 9:7 8:7 7:7 7:3 7:5 8:4 8:6
Margin for ARM and Hybrid Mortgage Loans (%) 6:4 6:6 6:3 6:1 5:9 6:1 6:0
7loans in 2006. In contrast, in the prime mortgage market, most mortgage loans are of the ¯xed-rate type.9
In 2007, in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis, it increased again to 28%. The proportion of balloon
mortgage contracts jumped substantially in 2006, and accounted for 25 percent of the total number of
mortgages originated that year. A balloon mortgage does not fully amortize over the term of the loan
and therefore requires a large ¯nal (balloon) payment. Less than 1 percent of the mortgages originated
over the sample period were adjustable-rate (non-hybrid) mortgages.
In the third block of Table 1, we report the purpose of the mortgage loans. In about 30 to 40 percent
of cases, the purpose is to ¯nance the purchase of a house. Approximately 55 percent of our subprime
mortgage loans were originated to extract cash, by re¯nancing an existing mortgage loan into a larger new
mortgage loan. The share of loans originated in order to re¯nance with no cash extraction is relatively
small.
In the ¯nal block of Table 1, we report the mean values for the variables that we will use in the
regression analysis (see Table 2 for a de¯nition of these variables). The average FICO credit score rose
20 points between 2001 and 2005. The combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio, which measures the value
of all-lien loans divided by the value of the house, slightly increased over 2001{2006, primarily because
of the increased popularity of second-lien and third-lien loans. The (back-end) debt-to-income ratio (if
provided) and the fraction of loans with a prepayment penalty were fairly constant. For about a third
of the loans in our database, no debt-to-income ratio was provided (the reported value in those cases is
zero); this is captured by the missing debt-to-income ratio dummy variable. The share of loans with full
documentation fell considerably over the sample period, from 77 percent in 2001 to 67 percent in 2007.
The mean mortgage rate fell from 2001 to 2004 and rebounded after that, consistent with movements in
both the 1-year and 10-year Treasury yields over the same period. Finally, the margin (over a reference
rate) for adjustable-rate and hybrid mortgages stayed rather constant over time.
We do not report summary statistics on the loan source, such as whether a mortgage broker interme-
diated, as the broad classi¯cation used in the database rendered this variable less informative.
9For example Koijen, Van Hemert, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2007) show that the fraction of conventional, single-family,
fully amortizing, purchase-money loans reported by the Federal Housing Financing Board in its Monthly Interest Rate Survey
that are of the ¯xed-rate type °uctuated between 60 and 90 percent from 2001 to 2006. Vickery (2007) shows that empirical
mortgage choice is a®ected by the eligibility of the mortgage loan to be purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
82.2 Performance of Loans by Market Segments
In Figure 1 (left panel) we showed that for the subprime mortgage market as a whole, vintage 2006 and
2007 loans stand out in terms of high delinquency rates (for variable de¯nitions, see Table 2). In Figure
3, we again plot the age pattern in the delinquency rate for vintages 2001 through 2007 and split the
subprime mortgage market into various segments. As the ¯gure shows, the poor performance of the 2006
and 2007 vintages is not con¯ned to a particular segment of the subprime market, but rather re°ects a
market-wide phenomenon.
In the six panels of Figure 3 we see that for hybrid, ¯xed-rate, purchase-money, cash-out re¯nancing,
low-documentation, and full-documentation mortgage loans, the 2006 and 2007 vintages show the highest
delinquency rate pattern. In general, vintages 2001 and 2005 come next in terms of delinquency rates,
and vintage 2003 loans have the lowest delinquency rates. Notice that the scale of the vertical axis di®ers
across the panels. The delinquency rates for the ¯xed-rate mortgages (FRMs) are lower than those for
hybrid mortgages but exhibit a remarkably similar pattern across vintage years.
In Figure 4 we plot the delinquency rates of all outstanding mortgages. Notice that the fraction of
FRMs that are delinquent remained fairly constant from 2005Q1 to 2007Q2. These rates are consistent
with those used in an August 2007 speech by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System (Bernanke
(2007)), who said \For subprime mortgages with ¯xed rather than variable rates, for example, serious
delinquencies have been fairly stable." It is important, though, to realize that this result is driven by an
aging e®ect of the FRM pool, caused by a decrease in the popularity of FRMs over 2001-2006 (see Table
1). In other words, FRMs originated in 2006 in fact performed unusually poorly (Figure 3, upper-right
Panel), but if one plots the delinquency rate of outstanding FRMs over time (Figure 4, left Panel), the
weaker performance of vintage 2006 loans is masked by the aging of the overall FRM pool.
3 Empirical Analysis of Delinquency Determinants
In this section we investigate to what extent a logit regression model can explain the high levels of
delinquencies for the vintage 2006 and 2007 mortgage loans in our database. All results in this section
are based on a random sample of one million ¯rst-lien subprime mortgage loans, originated between 2001
and 2007.
9Figure 3: Actual Delinquency Rate for Segments of the Subprime Mortgage Market
The ¯gure shows the age pattern in delinquency rate for the di®erent vintages. Each of the six panels focuses on a di®erent segment of






















































































































10Figure 4: Actual Delinquency Rates of Outstanding Mortgages














Actual Delinquency Rate (%)
3.1 Empirical Model Speci¯cation
We run the following logit regression
Pr(event) = ©(¯0X); (1)
where the event is delinquency of a subprime mortgage loan after a given number of months; ©(x) =
1=(1 + exp(¡x)) is the logit function; X is the vector of explanatory variables; and ¯ is the vector of
regression coe±cients. We will report the following statistics for each explanatory variable i:
marginali = ©(¯0 ¹ X + ¯i¾i) ¡ ©(¯0 ¹ X) (2)
deviation01i = (X01i ¡ ¹ Xi)=¾i (3)
contribution01i = ©(¯0 ¹ X + ¯i(X01i ¡ ¹ Xi)) ¡ ©(¯0 ¹ X) (4)
¼ marginali £ deviation01i (5)
where ¹ X is the vector with mean values, ¾i is the standard deviation of the i-th variable, and X01i is the
mean value of the i-th variable for vintage 2001 loans. We de¯ne mean value, deviation, and contribution
for vintage years other than 2001 in a similar fashion. Equation (5) emerges from a ¯rst-order Taylor
approximation with the derivative of the logit function with respect to the i-th variable approximated by
11marginali.10 The marginal statistic measures the e®ect of a one-standard-deviation increase in a variable
(from its mean) on the probability of an event. The deviation statistic measures the number of standard
deviations that the mean value of a variable in a particular vintage year was di®erent from the mean value
measured over the entire sample. The contribution statistic measures the deviation of the (average) event
probability in a particular vintage year from the (average) event probability over the entire sample that
can be explained by a particular variable.
For any subgroup of loans, such as a particular vintage, we can determine the predicted probability of





where the superscript j refers to the loan number and L is the total number of loans in the subgroup.
3.2 Variable De¯nitions
Table 2 provides the de¯nitions of the dependent and independent (explanatory) variables used in the
empirical analysis. We use the delinquency dummy variable as the dependent variable for the main
analysis and consider a foreclosure dummy variable in Appendix B. We de¯ne a loan to be delinquent if
payments on the loan are 60 or more days late, or the loan is reported as in foreclosure, real estate owned,
or default. We do not always observe for a terminated loan whether the loan was prepaid or there was
a default. In those cases we classify a terminated loan as a default if in the prior month the loan was in
foreclosure, and as a prepayment otherwise. In Appendix C we provide a robustness check by omitting
all terminated loans.
The borrower and loan characteristics we use in the analysis are: the FICO credit score, the combined
loan-to-value ratio, the value of the debt-to-income ratio (when provided), a dummy variable indicating
whether the debt-to-income ratio was missing (reported as zero), a dummy variable indicating whether the
loan was a cash-out re¯nancing, a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower was an investor (as
opposed to an owner-occupier), a dummy variable indicating whether full documentation was provided, a
dummy variable indicating whether there is a prepayment penalty on a loan, the (initial) mortgage rate,
and the margin for adjustable-rate and hybrid loans.11
10Technically, we ¯rst change units by multiplying by ¾i in Equation (2) and diving by ¾i in Equation (3).
11We also studied speci¯cations that included loan purpose, reported in Table 1, and housing outlook, de¯ned as the house
price accumulation in the year prior to the loan origination. These variables were not signi¯cant and did not materially
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13In addition, we construct a variable that measures house price appreciation from the time of origination
until the time we evaluate whether a loan is delinquent. To this end we use metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) level house price indexes from the O±ce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and
match loans with MSAs by using the zip code provided by LoanPerformance.12
We also considered the change in the unemployment rate from the period of origination until the
period of loan performance evaluation, which we could only measure accurately at the state-level for the
entire sample. It turned out that the unemployment variable mainly picked up the time trend in the
delinquency rate. The relationship between the (trending) unemployment rate and the (trending) loan
performance, however, is spurious. When vintage dummy variables are included in the regression, the
unemployment rate becomes insigni¯cant, both statistically and economically. We therefore decided to
omit the change in the unemployment rate as an explanatory variable.
In Table 2 we report the expected sign for the regression coe±cient on each of the explanatory variables
in parentheses.
3.3 Determinants of Delinquency
Table 3 shows the results of the logit regression (Equation 1), where the event is delinquency 12 months
after origination. The ¯rst column reports the explanatory variables. Column two reports the marginal
e®ect of the explanatory variables (Equation 2) for the baseline case speci¯cation, in which we add a
constant to the explanatory variables of column one. All marginal e®ects have the expected sign, as
reported in Table 2. Except for the ARM dummy, all variables are signi¯cant at the 1% con¯dence level.
The four explanatory variables with the largest (absolute) marginal e®ect and thus the most important for
explaining cross-sectional di®erences in loan performance are the FICO score, the combined loan-to-value
ratio, the mortgage rate, and the house price appreciation. According to the estimates, for example, a one
standard deviation increase in the FICO score decreases the delinquency rate 12 months after origination
by 2.33 percentage points. The product type has a relatively small e®ect on the performance of a loan,
beyond what is explained by other characteristics. In Figure 3 we showed that FRMs experience a much
lower delinquency rate than hybrid mortgages, which therefore must be driven by borrowers with better
12Estimating house price appreciation on the MSA-level, as opposed to the individual property level introduces a potential
measurement error of this variable. To the best of our knowledge, there is no data available to estimate the size of this
measurement error or to evaluate its impact on the results.
14characteristics selecting into FRMs.13 The pseudo R-squared statistic for the regression speci¯cation in
column two is 10.2%.
In columns three and four we consider two alternative regression speci¯cations: including both a
constant and a trend, and including vintage year dummies. Comparing columns two to four, we see that
the baseline case speci¯cation and these two alternative speci¯cations lead to very similar marginal e®ects.
The pseudo R-squared statistic is 10.7% for both the regression speci¯cations in columns three and four.
Hence adding a trend improves the ¯t compared to just including a constant. The (unreported) coe±cient
for the trend is positive and signi¯cant at the 1% con¯dence level. To gauge the economic signi¯cance we
compute the predicted yearly percentage point increase in delinquency 12 months after origination using
the regression coe±cient of the trend, ¯trend, as ©(¯0 ¹ X +¯trend)¡©(¯0 ¹ X) = 0:79%. Adding vintage year
dummies does not improve the ¯t further. The (unreported) values for the 7 vintage year dummies (2001,
..., 2007) are monotonically increasing over time. These results provide a ¯rst indication that loan quality
deteriorated over time, after controlling for the e®ect of the explanatory variables in column one.
We explored numerous alternative regression speci¯cations. First, we considered as explanatory vari-
ables those of the baseline case presented in Table 3, plus the 10 interaction and quadratic terms that can
be constructed from the four most important explanatory variables: the FICO score, the CLTV ratio, the
mortgage rate, and subsequent house price appreciation. Allowing for these additional terms, we take into
account the e®ect of risk-layering|such as, for example, the e®ect of a combination of a borrower's low
FICO score and a high CLTV ratio|on the probability of delinquency. It is in this case not a priori clear
what the sign on the FICO-CLTV interaction variable is. A negative sign means that a low FICO and a
high CLTV reinforce each other and give rise to a predicted delinquency probability that is higher than
when the interaction is ignored. A positive sign could be explained by lenders who originate a low FICO
and high CLTV loan only if they have positive private information on the loan or borrower quality. It turns
out that the coe±cient on the FICO-CLTV interaction term close to zero and insigni¯cant. More certain
is the sign we expect on the HPA-CLTV variable. Low house price appreciation is expected to especially
give rise to a higher delinquency probability for a high CLTV ratio, because the borrower is closer to a
situation with negative equity in the house (combined value of the mortgage loan larger than the market
value of the house). Consistent with this intuition, we ¯nd a negative and signi¯cant (at the 1 percent
level) coe±cient on this interaction term for delinquency 12 months after origination. Allowing for the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16interaction and quadratic terms did not substantially improve the overall ¯t, as measured by the pseudo
R-squared statistic. Second, we considered as additional explanatory variable a dummy for the presence
of the second-lien loan. This dummy variable had a positive signi¯cant e®ect on the predicted delinquency
rate. However, it merely inherited some of the predictive power of the CLTV variable, while leaving the
coe±cients on the other variables as well as the overall ¯t virtually unaltered. Third, we considered as
additional explanatory variable a dummy variable taking the value one whenever the CLTV equaled 80%,
aimed to control for silent seconds, referring to a situation where an investor takes out a second-lien loan
not reported in our database typically in combination with an 80% ¯rst-lien loan. This dummy variable
was statistically signi¯cant but economically not very large and moreover hardly improved the overall ¯t.
Fourth, we excluded the loans with not reported values of the debt-to-income ratios from the sample to
make sure the measurement error associated with this variable does not lead to a signi¯cant bias of the
results. The estimates based on the smaller subsample, in which debt-to-income variable has non-zero
reported values, are statistically and economically similar to those based on the entire sample of loans.
3.4 Contribution to Explaining the Poor Performance of 2001, 2006, 2007
In the last three columns of Table 3 we report the contribution of the di®erent explanatory variables to
explaining the relatively high delinquency rates of loans originated in 2001, 2006, and 2007. Up to a
¯rst-order approximation, the contribution equals the marginal e®ect, presented in column two, times the
average deviation from the sample mean of a variable in the respective years, presented in columns ¯ve to
seven (see Equations 2{5 for formal de¯nitions). First focussing on 2001, the mortgage rate was unusually
high, the FICO score low, and the subsequent house price appreciation low. All three e®ects contributed
to a high delinquency rate in 2001. In this sense one can say that loans originated in 2001 experienced the
\perfect storm." For example the low average FICO score for 2001 can already explain a 0.91 percentage
point increase in the delinquency rate 12 months after origination.
For vintages 2006 and 2007, low subsequent house price appreciation, in particular, contributed to their
weak performance, and accounted for a 2 to 4 percentage point increase in delinquency rate 12 months
after origination. The mean values in 2006 and 2007 for the other variables were not su±ciently di®erent
from the sample mean to contribute much to a di®erent delinquency for loans originated in those years.
It is worth noting that the high average CLTV ratio and the low fraction of loans with full documentation
for vintage 2006 loans do not contribute much to the high observed delinquency rates for those loans.
17We also computed the contributions of all explanatory factors for the other vintage years (not reported).
For loans originated in 2003 and 2004, the high subsequent house price appreciation between 2003 and
2005 contributed to a lower actual delinquency rate. For example, the explained change in the delinquency
rate 12 months after origination was {0.88 percentage points and {1.43 percentage points for 2003 and
2004, respectively. The house price appreciation variable had the largest (absolute) contribution among
all variables considered for those years. Therefore, we can say that high house price appreciation between
2003 and 2005 masked the true riskiness of subprime mortgages.14
3.5 Adjusted Delinquency Rates
To examine to what extent the logit regression model is capable of explaining the large observed delin-
quency rates in 2006 and 2007, we plot the adjusted delinquency rates for di®erent ages and di®erent
vintages in Figure 1 (right panel). The adjusted rate at a given age equals the prediction error (the actual
rate minus the predicted rate) plus the weighted average rate over the 2001{2007 period, with weights
equal to the number of loans originated in each year. The predicted delinquency rate is determined using
Equation 6. We add up the weighted-average actual rates to facilitate the comparison with the actual
rates plotted in Figure 1 (left panel). Interestingly, the adjusted delinquency rates have been increasing
over the past seven years. In other words, loan quality deteriorated monotonically between 2001 and
2007. This picture is in sharp contrast with that obtained from actual rates, where 2003 was the year
with the lowest delinquency rates, and 2001 was the year with the third-highest rates. In Subsection 3.3
we found a similar result: when adding a trend variable as explanatory variable, the associated regression
coe±cient implies a yearly increase of about 0.79 percentage points in the delinquency rate 12 months
after origination. This amounts to a 4 to 5 percentage point increase over the 2001{2007 sample period
that is due to the trend and thus not explained by the explanatory variables listed in column one of
Table 3. The ¯nding of a continual deterioration in loan performance also obtains when analyzing fore-
closure rates (Appendix B), omitting terminated loans from the analysis (Appendix C), and analyzing
hybrid mortgages and FRMs separately (Appendix D). Moreover, it obtains for the numerous alternative
regression speci¯cations discussed in Subsection 3.3 (not reported).
Next we study the following question: Based on information available at the end of 2005, was the
dramatic deterioration of loan quality since 2001 already apparent? Notice that we cannot answer this
14Shiller (2007) argues that house prices were too high compared to fundamentals in this period and refers to the house
price boom as a classic speculative bubble largely driven by an extravagant expectation for future house price appreciation.
18question by simply inspecting vintages 2001 through 2005 in Figure 1 (right panel), because the com-
putation of the adjusted delinquency rate for, say, vintage 2001 loans, makes use of a regression model
estimated using data from 2001 through 2008. Hence, we re-estimate the logit regression model underlying
Figure 1 (right panel) making use of only 2001{2005 data. The resulting age pattern in adjusted delin-
quency rates is plotted in Figure 5 (left panel). We again obtain the result that the adjusted delinquency
rate rose monotonically from 2001. We therefore conclude that the dramatic deterioration of loan quality
should have been apparent by the end of 2005. Figure 5 (right panel) depicts the situation when we use
data available at the end of 2006. Again, the deterioration is clearly visible.15
Figure 5: Adjusted Delinquency Rate, Viewed at the End of 2005 and 2006. Delinquency is de¯ned
as being 60 or more days late with the monthly mortgage payment, in foreclosure, real-estate owned, or
defaulted. The adjusted delinquency rate is obtained by adjusting the actual rate for year-by-year variation
in FICO scores, loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income ratios, missing debt-to-income ratio dummies, cash-
out re¯nancing dummies, owner-occupation dummies, documentation levels, percentage of loans with
prepayment penalties, mortgage rates, margins, house price appreciation since origination, composition
of mortgage contract types, and origination amounts.
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15One reason why investors did not massively start to avoid or short subprime-related securities is that the timing of the
subprime market downturn may have been hard to predict. Moreover, a short position is associated with a high cost of carry
(Feldstein (2007)).
194 Non-Stationarity of the Loan-to-Value E®ect
The logit regression speci¯cation used in Section 3 assumes that the regression coe±cients are constant over
time. That is, the e®ect of a unit change in an explanatory variable on the delinquency rate is the same in,
for example, 2006 as it is in 2001, holding constant the values of the other explanatory variables. We test
the validity of this assumption for all variables in our analysis by running cross-sectional OLS regressions
for each calendar month from 2001 to 2006 and checking the stability of the regression coe±cients. It
turns out that the strongest rejection of a constant regression coe±cient is for the CLTV ratio. In this
section we ¯rst discuss this ¯nding and then turn to the question of whether lenders were aware of the
non-stationarity of the loan-to-value e®ect, by investigating the relationship between the loan-to-value
ratio and mortgage rates over time.
4.1 Loan-to-Value Ratio and the Delinquency Rate
We consider three di®erent CLTV value categories: CLTV<80%, CLTV=80%, and CLTV>80%, which
account for about 28%, 15%, and 57% respectively of all loans originated in 2001{2007. Table 4 reports
the actual minus the predicted delinquency rate for the di®erent CLTV value categories and di®erent
vintage years, estimated using Equation 6. In other words, the table reports the average prediction error
for the three CLTV subgroups discussed above and for each origination year of loans. A positive prediction
error means that the actual delinquency rate was higher than the rate predicted by the logit regression
model. Consistent with Figure 1 (right panel), the error increased over time. However, for the lowest
CLTV group, the increase in the error was much smaller than that for the other groups and, in fact,
had been fairly stable from 2004 onward. For a CLTV ratio of 80 percent, the increase in the error was
5:2 percentage points, and for the CLTV ratio above 80 percent, the increase was 8:8 percentage points.
Therefore, high CLTV ratios were increasingly associated with higher delinquency rates, beyond what is
captured by the logit regression model.
4.2 Loan-to-Value Ratio and the Mortgage Rate
The combined LTV ratio rather than the ¯rst-lien LTV ratio is believed to be the main determinant of
delinquency, because it is the burden of all the debt together that may trigger ¯nancial problems for the
borrower. In contrast, the ¯rst-lien LTV is the more important determinant of the mortgage rate on a
20Table 4: Actual Minus Predicted Delinquency Rate
This table presents the actual minus the predicted delinquency rate 12 months after origination for di®erent vintages and combined
loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2007{2001
CLTV < 80% ¡2:2% ¡2:1% ¡0:7% 0:4% 0:2% ¡0:5% 0:5% 2:8%
CLTV = 80% ¡2:8% ¡2:1% ¡0:6% 0:7% 1:9% 2:4% 2:5% 5:2%
CLTV > 80% ¡4:6% ¡3:4% ¡1:4% 0:1% 0:1% 1:6% 4:2% 8:8%
¯rst-lien mortgage, because it captures the dollar amount at stake for the ¯rst-lien lender.16
In this subsection we examine whether lenders were aware that high LTV ratios were increasingly
associated with riskier borrowers. Speci¯cally, we test whether the sensitivity of the lender's interest
rate to the ¯rst-lien LTV ratio changed over time. We perform a cross-sectional OLS regression with the
mortgage rate as the dependent variable and loan characteristics, including the ¯rst-lien LTV and second-
lien LTV (CLTV minus ¯rst-lien LTV), as independent variables.17 We perform one such regression for
each calendar quarter in our sample period. We can only expect to get accurate results when using
relatively homogeneous groups of loans, and therefore consider fully amortizing FRM and 2/28 hybrid
loans separately. Together these two contract types account for about half of all mortgage loans in our
database. Each cross-sectional regression is based on a minimum of 18,784 observations.
Figure 2 shows the regression coe±cient on the ¯rst-lien LTV ratio for each quarter from 2001Q1
through 2007Q2.18 We scaled the coe±cients by the standard deviation of the ¯rst-lien LTV ratio, and
they can therefore be interpreted as the changes in the mortgage rates when the ¯rst-lien LTV ratios are
increased by one standard deviation. In the fourth quarter of 2006, a one-standard-deviation increase in the
¯rst-lien LTV ratio corresponded to about a 30-basis-point increase in the mortgage rate for 2/28 hybrids
and about a 40-basis-point increase for FRMs, keeping constant other loan characteristics. In contrast,
in the ¯rst quarter of 2001, the corresponding rate increase was 10 and 16 basis points respectively. This
provides evidence that lenders were to some extent aware of high LTV ratios being increasingly associated
16This is con¯rmed by our empirical results. To conserve space the results are not reported.
17Speci¯cally, we use the FICO score, ¯rst-lien loan-to-value ratio, second-lien loan-to-value ratio, debt-to-income ratio, a
dummy for a missing debt-to-income ratio, a cash-out re¯nancing dummy, a dummy for owner occupation, documentation
dummy, prepayment penalty dummy, margin, origination amount, term of the mortgage, and prepayment term as the right-
hand-side variables.
18Our data extends to 2007Q3, but due to a near shutdown of the securitized subprime mortgage market we lack statistical
power in this quarter.
21with risky borrowers.19 In Appendix E we show that this result is robustness to allowing for a non-linear
relation between the mortgage rate and the ¯rst-lien LTV ratio. Finally, notice that the e®ect of a one-
standard-deviation increase in the ¯rst-lien LTV ratio on the 2/28 mortgage rate increased substantially
in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis: from 30 basis points in 2007Q1 to 42 basis points in 2007Q2.
5 Subprime-Prime Rate Spread
In general, interest rates on subprime mortgages are higher than on prime mortgages to compensate the
lender for the (additional) default risk associated with subprime loans. In this section we analyze the
time series of the subprime-prime rate spread, both with and without adjustment for changes in loan and
borrower characteristics. We focus on ¯xed-rate mortgages for this exercise. For hybrid mortgages the
subprime-prime comparison is more complicated because (i) both the initial (teaser) rate and the margin
should be factored in, and (ii) we don't have good data on the prime initial rates and margins.
In Figure 6 we show the actual subprime-prime rate spread, de¯ned in the Equation (8) below. The
subprime rate is from the LoanPerformance database, calculated for this exercise as the average across
individual loans mortgage rate at the time of origination for each calendar month; the prime rate is
the contract rate on ¯xed-rate mortgages reported by the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) in
its Monthly Interest Rate Survey.20 The subprime-prime spread|the di®erence between the average
subprime and the prime rates|decreased substantially over time, with the largest decline between 2001
and 2004, which coincides with the most rapid growth in the number of loans originated (see Table 1). In
Figure 6 we also plot the yield spread between 10-year BBB and AAA corporate bonds, which we obtained
from Standard and Poor's Global Fixed Income Research. Compared to the corporate BBB-AAA yield
spread, the actual subprime-prime rate spread declined much more and more steadily, hence the decline
cannot just be attributed to a change in the overall level of risk aversion.
We perform a cross-sectional OLS regression with the loan-level spread as the dependent variable and
the prime rate and various subprime loan and borrower characteristics as the explanatory variables, using
19The e®ects of other loan characteristics on mortgage rates have been much more stable over time, as unreported results
suggest.
20Available at http://www.fhfb.gov/GetFile.aspx?FileID=6416.
22Figure 6: FRM Rate Spread and Corporate Bond Yield Spread













data from 2001 through 2006.21
spreadit = ¯0 + ¯1primet + ¯0
2characteristicsit + errorit; (7)
spreadit = subprimeit ¡ primet (8)
Notice that the ¯1primet term corrects for the fact that the spread is a®ected by the prime rate itself,
and thus changes over the business cycle, because a higher prime rate increases the default probability
on subprime loans for a given spread. In Figure 7 we plot the prediction error, averaged per origination
month t, along with a ¯tted linear trend.
The downward trend in Figure 7 indicates that the subprime-prime spread, after adjusting for di®er-
ences in observed loan and borrower characteristics, declined. In Figure 1 (right panel) we showed that
loan quality, obtained by adjusting loan performance for di®erences in loan and borrower characteristics
and subsequent house price appreciation, deteriorated over the period, and thus the (adjusted) riskiness
of loans rose. Therefore, on a per-unit-of-risk basis, the subprime-prime mortgage spread decreased even
more than the level of the spread.
21The explanatory factors in the regression are the FICO credit score, a dummy variable that equals one if full docu-
mentation was provided, a dummy variable that equals one if prepayment penalty is present, origination amount, value of
debt-to-income ratio, a dummy variable that equals one if debt-to-income was not provided, a dummy variable that equals
one if loan is a re¯nancing, a dummy variable that equals one if a borrower is an investor, loan-to-value ratio based on a
¯rst-lien, and loan-to-value ratios based on a second, third, etc. liens if applicable.
23Figure 7: Prediction Error in the Subprime-Prime Rate Spread
The ¯gure shows the prediction error in the subprime-prime rate spread, determined in a regression of the spread on the prime rate
and the following loan and borrower characteristics: FICO credit score, a dummy variable that equals one if full documentation was
provided, a dummy variable that equals one if a prepayment penalty is present, origination amount, value of debt-to-income ratio, a
dummy variable that equals one if debt-to-income was not provided, a dummy variable that equals one if the loan is a re¯nancing, a
dummy variable that equals one if a borrower is an investor, loan-to-value ratio based on a ¯rst lien, and loan-to-value ratio based on a












The subprime mortgage market experienced explosive growth between 2001 and 2006. Angell and Rowley
(2006) and Ki® and Mills (2007), among others, argue that this was facilitated by the development of
private-label mortgage backed securities, which do not carry any kind of credit risk protection by the
Government Sponsored Enterprises. Investors in search of higher yields kept increasing their demand for
private-label mortgage-backed securities, which also led to sharp increases in the subprime share of the
mortgage market (from around 8 percent in 2001 to 20 percent in 2006) and in the securitized share of
the subprime mortgage market (from 54 percent in 2001 to 75 percent in 2006).
In this paper we show that during the dramatic growth of the subprime (securitized) mortgage market,
the quality of the market deteriorated dramatically. We analyze loan quality as the performance of loans,
adjusted for di®erences in borrower characteristics (such as credit score, level of indebtedness, ability
to provide documentation), loan characteristics (such as product type, amortization term, loan amount,
interest rate), and subsequent house price appreciation.
The decline in loan quality has been monotonic, but not equally spread among di®erent types of bor-
24rowers. Over time, high-LTV borrowers became increasingly risky (their adjusted performance worsened
more) compared to low-LTV borrowers. Securitizers seem to have been aware of this particular pattern in
the relative riskiness of borrowers: We show that over time mortgage rates became more sensitive to the
LTV ratio of borrowers. In 2001, for example, a borrower with a one standard deviation above-average
LTV ratio paid a 10 basis point premium compared to an average LTV borrower. In contrast, in 2006 the
premium paid by the high LTV borrower was around 30 basis point.
In principal, the subprime-prime mortgage rate spread (subprime mark-up) should account for the
default risk of subprime loans. For the rapid growth of the subprime mortgage market to have been
sustainable, the increase in the overall riskiness of subprime loans should have been accompanied by an
increase in the subprime mark-up. In this paper we show that this was not the case: Subprime mark-
up|adjusted and not adjusted for changes in di®erences in borrower and loan characteristics|declined
over time. With the bene¯t of hindsight we now know that indeed this situation was not sustainable,
and the subprime mortgage market experienced a severe crisis in 2007. In many respects, the subprime
market experienced a classic lending boom-bust scenario with rapid market growth, loosening underwriting
standards, deteriorating loan performance, and decreasing risk premiums.22 Argentina in 1980, Chile in
1982, Sweden, Norway, and Finland in 1992, Mexico in 1994, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea in 1997 all
experienced the culmination of a boom-bust scenario, albeit in di®erent economic settings.
Were problems in the subprime mortgage market apparent before the actual crisis showed signs in
2007? Our answer is yes, at least by the end of 2005. Using the data available only at the end of 2005,
we show that the monotonic degradation of the subprime market was already apparent. Loan quality had
been worsening for ¯ve years in a row at that point. Rapid appreciation in housing prices masked the
deterioration in the subprime mortgage market and thus the true riskiness of subprime mortgage loans.
When housing prices stopped climbing, the risk in the market became apparent.
22A more detailed discussion, theory, and empirical evidence on such episodes is available in Dell'Ariccia and Marquez
(2006), DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerretche (2001), and Kamisky and Reinhart
(1999), among many others.
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27A Reclassi¯cation of Loan-Level Data
The main database we utilize in this paper is the loan-level data on US securitized subprime mortgage loans, provided by
First American LoanPerformance. Since the ¯rst version of this paper, October 9th 2007, LoanPerformance retroactively
reclassi¯ed a large number of negative amortization loans from subprime to Alt-A. This reclassi¯cation was requested by the
clients of the trustees of the mortgage pools. Most of the reclassi¯cation occurred over the ¯rst months of 2008. Analyzing
the data before and after the reclassi¯cation we ¯nd that the reclassi¯ed loans had on average a larger balance and performed
better in terms of lower delinquency rates. We checked extensively with LoanPerformance that the set of loans used in the
current version of the paper corresponds to the intended post-reclassi¯cation data, as of May 2008.
It is not clear whether the data before or after reclassi¯cation is most suitable for the purpose of researching the subprime
crisis that occurred before the reclassi¯cation. It is however reassuring that our main results are robust to the reclassi¯cation.
To illustrate, Figure 8 shows the actual (left panel) and adjusted (right panel) delinquency rates as reported in earlier versions
of this paper. It re°ects the situation before the reclassi¯cation. Notice in the right panel that again the adjusted delinquency
rate has been increasing monotonically over the past six years.
Figure 8: Pre-Reclassi¯cation Actual and Adjusted Delinquency Rate
The ¯gure shows the age pattern in the actual (left panel) and adjusted (right panel) delinquency rate for the di®erent vintage years
prior to the reclassi¯cation of loans by LoanPerformance. Delinquency for this ¯gure is de¯ned as being 60 days or more late with the
monthly mortgage payment, in foreclosure, or real-estate owned. The adjusted delinquency rate is obtained by adjusting the actual rate
for year-by-year variation in FICO scores, loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income ratios, missing debt-to-income ratio dummies, cash-out
re¯nancing dummies, owner-occupation dummies, documentation levels, percentage of loans with prepayment penalties, mortgage rates,
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28B Foreclosure Rates
In this Appendix we show that the continual deterioration of adjusted loan performance over the 2001{2007 period is robust
to using foreclosure, instead of delinquency, as measure for loan performance. Foreclosure is de¯ned as a loan being in
foreclosure, real-estate owned, or defaulted. In Figure 9 we present actual (left panel) and adjusted (right panel) foreclosure
rates. The actual foreclosure rate for age six months and younger is close to zero, in contrast to the actual delinquency rate
at this age, presented in Figure 1 (left panel). For older ages the actual foreclosure rate is roughly speaking twice as low as
the actual delinquency rate. Notice that besides these two di®erences between actual delinquency and foreclosure rates, the
age patterns for the di®erent vintages is remarkably similar for delinquency and foreclosure. In particular, the ranking of the
vintage years in terms of loan performance is the same. The adjusted foreclosure rates presented in Figure 9 (right panel)
are again increasing in vintage year, but di®erent vintages are relatively closer in terms of adjusted performance than for our
analysis of adjusted delinquency rates, Figure 1 (right panel).
Figure 9: Actual and Adjusted Foreclosure Rates
The ¯gure shows the age pattern in the actual (left panel) and adjusted (right panel) foreclosure rate for the di®erent vintage years.
Foreclosure is de¯ned as a loan being in foreclosure, real-estate owned, or defaulted. The adjusted foreclosure rate is obtained by
adjusting the actual rate for year-by-year variation in FICO scores, loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income ratios, missing debt-to-income
ratio dummies, cash-out re¯nancing dummies, owner-occupation dummies, documentation levels, percentage of loans with prepayment
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C Delinquency Rate without Terminated Loans
For the regressions in Section 3 we used the probability that a loan of a particular age is delinquent as dependent variable.
For this exercise we included terminated loans and subsumed loans terminated due to default in our de¯nition of delinquency.
In certain cases the inference whether a terminated loan is a defaulted or prepaid loan was based on whether the loan was in
29foreclosure or not the month prior to termination. In this appendix we con¯rm that our main results are robust to excluding
all terminated loans and thus examine delinquency conditional on the loan not being terminated before the age of interest.
Since the focus in this paper is on young loans (age below 24 months), we do not expect terminations to play an important
role. The fraction of loans that terminate in the ¯rst 12 months is 10%, 11%, 15%, 18%, 16%, 12%, 7% for 2001{2007 vintage
loans respectively. This fraction peaks in 2004, during the heyday of the house price boom, which created favorable re¯nancing
opportunities. Remarkably, it is relatively low for vintage 2001 loans, which were originated prior to interest rate declines.
This result might be particular for loans of age below 24 months. For hybrid mortgage loans many re¯nances may occur at
or after the moment of the rate reset, which is typically at a loan age of 24 or 36 months.
23
We re-estimate the results presented in Table 3|analyzing the e®ects of loan characteristics, borrower characteristics,
and economic circumstances on the probability of delinquency|but this time exclude loans that are terminated prior to the
moment of loan performance evaluation.
Using this alternative de¯nition for delinquency, all explanatory variables we use in the regression (see Table 3) have the
same sign and remain statistically signi¯cant, except for the ARM dummy. The mortgage rate, FICO score, the CLTV ratio,
and the subsequent house price appreciation remain the most important explanatory variables, measured by the absolute size
of the marginal e®ect.
In Figure 10 we plot the actual delinquency rate (left panel) and adjusted delinquency rate (right panel) based on the
de¯nition above that excludes terminated loans. In general the delinquency rate is somewhat higher than based on the
baseline case de¯nition of delinquency, in particular at older loan ages, see Figure 1 (both panels). Excluding terminations
due to a prepayment will increase the delinquency rate compared to the baseline case. Excluding terminations due to a
default have the opposite e®ect. Hence we ¯nd that the prepayment e®ect dominates the default e®ect. Importantly, both
for the actual and the adjusted delinquency rate the order of the lines for the di®erent vintage years remain unchanged. We
again have the result that the adjusted delinquency rate has been steadily rising over the past seven years.
D Adjusted Delinquency Rate for Hybrids and FRMs Separately
In this Appendix we show that the continual deterioration of adjusted loan performance over the 2001{2007 period also
obtains when performing a separate regression analysis for the main contract types, as opposed to the baseline case in the
main text where we perform a regression for all loans, but include contract type dummies in the regression speci¯cation.
Figure 11 shows the adjusted delinquency rate for the two main contract types: 2/28 hybrids and FRMs. For both contract
types, the adjusted delinquency rates have been monotonically increasing over time. Except for a level di®erence, the age
pattern for the di®erent vintage years looks very much the same for the two contract types.
E Non-Linearity in the Sensitivity of the Mortgage Rate to the LTV
In Figure 2 we plotted the sensitivity of the ¯xed-rate and 2/28 hybrid mortgage rates to the ¯rst-lien LTV ratio. The
sensitivity is de¯ned as the regression coe±cient on the ¯rst-lien LTV (scaled by the standard deviation) in a regression
23Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007) argue that the risk associated with mortgage prepayments is priced in the
mortgage-backed securities market.
30Figure 10: Actual and Adjusted Delinquency Rates, Excluding Terminated Loans
The ¯gure shows the actual delinquency rates (left panel) and adjusted delinquency rates (right panel) excluding terminated (prepaid
and defaulted) loans for the di®erent vintage years. Delinquency is de¯ned as being 60 days or more late with the monthly mortgage
payment, in foreclosure, real-estate owned or defaulted. The adjusted delinquency rate is obtained by adjusting the actual rate for
year-by-year variation in FICO scores, loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income ratios, missing debt-to-income ratio dummies, cash-out
re¯nancing dummies, owner-occupation dummies, documentation levels, percentage of loans with prepayment penalties, mortgage rates,



































 Adjusted Delinquency Rate (%), Excluding Terminations
Figure 11: Adjusted Delinquency Rates for Hybrids and FRMs Separately
The ¯gure shows the adjusted delinquency rates based on hybrid mortgages (left panel) and FRMs (right panel) separately. Delinquency is
de¯ned as being 60 days or more late with the monthly mortgage payment, in foreclosure, real-estate owned or defaulted. The adjusted
delinquency rate is obtained by adjusting the actual rate for year-by-year variation in FICO scores, loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-
income ratios, missing debt-to-income ratio dummies, cash-out re¯nancing dummies, owner-occupation dummies, documentation levels,
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31with the mortgage rate as dependent variable and the ¯rst-lien LTV, the second-lien LTV, and the other loan and borrower
characteristics listed in Subsection 4.2, as independent variables.
In this appendix we study the robustness of this result to adding the square of the ¯rst-lien LTV and the square of the
second-lien LTV as independent variables, therefore allowing for a non-linear functional form. In Figure 12 we report the
resulting scaled marginal e®ect of the ¯rst-lien LTV for ¯xed-rate and 2/28 hybrid mortgages evaluated at a ¯rst-lien LTV
of 80 percent (left panel) and 90 percent (right panel). Without non-linear terms the marginal e®ect is simply given by
the regression coe±cient. This is what we plotted in Figure 2. With the quadratic terms, the marginal e®ect is given by
¯LTV + 2¯LTV 2X, where the ¯s are the regression coe±cients and X is the ¯rst-lien LTV ratio at which the marginal e®ect
is evaluated.
Figure 12: Sensitivity of Mortgage Rate to First-Lien LTV Ratio Allowing for Non-Linearity
The ¯gure shows the scaled marginal e®ect of the ¯rst-lien loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on the mortgage rate for ¯rst-lien ¯xed-rate and
2/28 hybrid mortgages, evaluated at a ¯rst-lien LTV of 80% (left panel) and 90% (right panel). The e®ect is determined using an
OLS regression with the interest rate as dependent variable and the FICO score, ¯rst-lien LTV (and the square), second-lien LTV
(and the square), debt-to-income ratio, missing debt-to-income ratio dummy, cash-out re¯nancing dummy, owner-occupation dummy,






















Scaled Marginal Effect of First−Lien LTV = 90% (%)
As shown in Figure 12, the marginal e®ect is rising over time, consistent with the baseline case results presented in Figure
2. Moreover, we ¯nd that there is a statistically and economically signi¯cant non-linear e®ect of the ¯rst-lien LTV on the
mortgage rate. Comparing the left and right panels in Figure 12, the higher the ¯rst-lien LTV ratio, the more sensitive is
the mortgage rate to changes in the ¯rst-lien LTV. The largest di®erence between the results based on speci¯cations with
and without non-linearity is observed for 2/28 hybrid mortgages in 2007 at a ¯rst-lien LTV of 90 percent (right panel). The
scaled marginal e®ect increases by 27 basis points over the course of 3 months in 2007 when a model allows for non-linearity.
In contrast, ignoring the non-linearity, as in Figure 2, the increase in the scaled marginal e®ect is only 13 basis points.
32